✪✪✪ GWU Personal Statement
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Together they reveal the kind of information that the President was hearing, including when, how, and from whom. They reveal, strikingly and often jarringly, the kind of incomplete and often flawed information that was being used to make important decisions. And they show the gap between what was being said in public and what was being said in private, a phenomenon that had troubled the administration less than a year earlier in the Tonkin Gulf episode and would become increasingly important as the Vietnam War raged on.
Duty officer Jim Murray fielded the call. The USS Boxer , on station off the coast of the Dominican Republic, was being used as a floating base to evacuate Americans by helicopter from a polo field next to the Hotel Embajador in the western outskirts of Santo Domingo. Later in the day, Johnson would order the Marines to move into Santo Domingo, but for now their mission was confined to evacuation. The recording begins after the conversation has started. Tape No. They think he's just a stooge for the deal.
But nobody thought Castro was either. Using his extensive contacts in Latin America, lawyer and future Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas volunteered to act as a line of communication with Juan Bosch, the exiled President of the Dominican Republic who had been ousted in a coup in and had since been in self-imposed exile in Puerto Rico. William "Red" Raborn's first day on the job was a busy one. He had been sworn in as the new Director of Central Intelligence, replacing John McCone, just eight hours before Johnson went on national television to announce that U.
Marines were landing in Santo Domingo. A notable aspect of this conversation is Johnson asking whether the CIA was caught by surprise by the deterioration in the Dominican Republic. The question anticipated later disputes about whether intelligence agencies had failed to provide adequate warning to policymakers. But the absense of a secure, reliable means of communicating in real-time with U. Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Bromley Smith played a crucial role in channeling the flow of information in and out of the White House. He had important new information to pass on to the President from the U.
The Marines are in open fire with the Communists. They started shooting at our embassy, and the Marines are shooting back. The President, in turn, passed on the news that the situation on the ground in Santo Domingo was heating up. In the early hours of the morning, LBJ gets an update on the situation directly from the U. Bennett expressed confidence that now that the Marines have arrived matters are well in hand, but he also paints a sobering picture of the dangerous situation on the streets of Santo Domingo. Over the previous half-hour, Johnson had spoken with duty officers in the White House Situation Room and the Pentagon Command Center for the latest status reports on the situations in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.
You be arousing them as much as [they] arouse you. During a telephone call about 13 hours earlier, Ambassador Bennett had been relatively upbeat about the situation. LBJ again returns to his concerns about public messaging and emphasizes to both Bennett and Martin that they should be devoting their efforts to generating public sentiment for the U. This call again illustrates the problem the speakers faced in using open, unencrypted telephone lines for communicating between the White House and the U. Embassy in Santo Domingo.
An operator connects the call and Bennett holds. Voices can be heard in the background, probably on the television, but what they are saying cannot be made out. Abe Fortas calls to express his concerns about the latest draft of a negotiating position being circulated amongst the State Department and McGeorge Bundy, who had travelled to the Dominican Republic to lead negotiations on an agreement. A key element was how hard to push a new Dominican government to demonstrate its commitment to anti-Communism by deporting 23 people identified as being foreign-trained Communists. Robert McNamara had joined him.
Having spent the afternoon swimming and having just finished an early Sunday dinner, LBJ took the call from Fortas. He asked McNamara to listen in on the phone in the next room. McNamara stays silent through most of the call. In the excerpts below from the long call, LBJ expounds on what he sees as the proper roles for the United States and the Organization of American States in helping to bring the situation in the Dominican Republic to a peaceful and stable conclusion; the influence of domestic politics in shaping the U.
The president also expresses some regrets about how the operation turned out. Although he seems to fault Bundy and Fortas for their handling of negotiations, he ultimately blames himself. Sometimes I take other people's judgments, and I get misled. Like sending troops in there to Santo Domingo. But the man who misled me was Lyndon Johnson, nobody else.
I did that. Well after the initial intervention, as an Organization of American States coalition led by Brazilian forces enforced a ceasefire and maintained order, LBJ continued to be concerned about how the episode was being perceived by public opinion at home and abroad. In this telephone call, Johnson tries to enlist the help of former President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his brother, Milton.
Like his predecessor, John F. Kennedy, President Johnson made a point of consulting frequently with Eisenhower, especially on foreign policy matters such as Vietnam. They made sure to keep Eisenhower briefed on key issues and reached out in person by either inviting the former president to the White House, meeting elsewhere in Washington DC when he was in town, or by calling on the telephone. Kennedy and Johnson were both interested in benefiting from the depth of Eisenhower's experience.
But there was inevitably more to it. The elder statesman remained a powerful and influential figure in the Republican party. As his administration progressed and the war in Vietnam deteriorated, Johnson pointed to his consultations with Eisenhower in attempts to defuse partisan criticism of his administration's conduct of the war. In this conversation, LBJ also floated the idea of calling on Eisenhower's brother Milton, the president of Johns Hopkins University who had deep experience in Latin America, to head off criticism of how the administration had handled the Dominican crisis.
The first of those programs, and the unconventional shape of the aircraft produced, had its origins in a work Document 10 by Russian theoretical physicist and electric engineer Pytor Ufimtsev — which did not spur the Russian air force to either classify the work or make use of it. A foreword explained that Ufimtsev studied the scattering characteristics of "reflecting bodies with abrupt surface discontinuities or with sharp edges. Ben Rich, Kelly Johnson's successor as head of the Lockheed Skunk Works, would report in his memoirs that one afternoon a "Skunk Works mathematician and radar specialist named Denys Overholser Once it was declared operational, the F was available for use in combat operations. The Air Force nearly used it in the attacks on Libya, ordered by President Reagan in response to Libyan involvement in the La Belle Disco bombing in West Berlin, but ultimately did not because of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's reluctance to reveal the plane's existence.
These operations were the subject of an official chronology Document 17 , an Army War College essay Document 18 and the official history of the 37 th Fighter Wing Document The General Accounting Office GAO conducted a critical examination of the stealth fighter's effectiveness Document 23 as part of its evaluation of the air war. The GAO found that the F bomb hit range was "highly effective" — varying between 41 and 60 percent — but it did not reach the 80 percent claimed by the Defense Department. Other histories of the F wing which had become the 49 th Wing by included accounts of its participation in a variety of exercises as well as its use for coercive diplomacy.
Both were ordered in response to Iraqi non-compliance with U. Security Council resolutions, but did not result in combat operations. In , Fs did go into combat — in the Balkans — a subject that was discussed in the January - June history Document 27 of the 49 th Fighter Wing. Much of the treatment is redacted from the released version, although the declassified version reports that after the first round of strikes on March 24, , General William Lake told his commanders "everyone is back safely. So far the score is Fs 10, Yugoslav's 0. Deployments to South Korea and Southwest Asia, including use during the Iraq War, as well exercises, are covered in histories Document 34 , Document 37 for and The Black Sheep history covers orders to deploy for combat, the attempted decapitation strike intended to kill Saddam Hussein, subsequent combat missions, and an assessment of F performance in the war.
The Soviet military may not have initially embraced Ufimtsev's work, but it was inevitable, because of both internal and external influences, that they would eventually explore its use for their own aerial programs and for counteracting U. The assessment examined Soviet radar cross section technology and a variety of potential applications to submarines, reentry vehicles, aircraft, spacecraft, cruise missiles, and ground vehicles. The same month that the CIA produced that assessment the Agency's continued interest in further work on Soviet stealth efforts was indicated by a memo Document 42 from Julian C. Nail observed that the topic was on the agenda for a National Foreign Intelligence Board meeting in early March , memos were being prepared for Casey to send to each principal indicating the importance he attached to the subject, and that the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research was seeking to enhance its analysis of the subject, mainly by getting additional clearances so the CIA analysts could learn about U.
How the Soviets might react to U. Two key sections of the estimate focused on the counter-stealth potential of current and near-term Soviet systems including early warning radar, fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missile, antiaircraft artillery, and command, control, and communications systems and future Soviet technical responses. Another section examined prospective Soviet stealth developments — including the process of incorporating stealth vehicles in Soviet military planning and the acquisition and use of stealth technology.
One indication that the Air Force may have limited the knowledge and the ability of U. Moreover, that figure was based on speculation what , at the time, the rumored stealth fighter might look like — speculation that proved to be considerably wide of the mark. A month later the OSWR director reported the number of new clearances 25 that were necessary to implement the stealth analytical effort Document 47 Beyond the total clearances needed, the director indicated the offices involved and the specific topics to be examined. Thus, air defense and aircraft systems specialists at OSWR would work on stealth penetration analysis studies, specialists in the Office of Soviet Analysis would conduct strategic studies related to the implications of stealth capabilities, and other specialists in OSWR would examine Soviet weapons and technology.
Besides secret U. Israel acquired the plane in August when a captain in the Iraqi air force defected, landing the MiG at an airbase in northern Israel — an action that been arranged in advance by the Mossad, Israel's secret intelligence service. From January 23, to April 8, the plane was loaned to the U. Air Force. One report focused on technical characteristics of the plane, while another was a tactical evaluation. The latter Document 50 had four primary objectives: 1 evaluating of the effectiveness of existing of existing tactical maneuvers by the Air Force and Navy combat aircraft and associated weapons against the MiG, 2 exploiting the tactical capabilities and limitations of the MiG in air-to-air combat, 3 optimizing existing tactics and develop new tactics to defeat the MiG, and 4 evaluating the design, performance, and characteristics of the MiG The exploitation reports spelled out the findings including Document 50 with historical retrospectives about the effort prepared later Document 48 , Document In the s the effort moved to Tonopah Test Range, about 70 miles northwest of Area Other aspects of Area 51 activities included tests of covertly acquired Soviet-radar systems.
According to one account "a complex of actual Soviet systems and replicas" grew around Slater Lake, a mile northwest of the main base. The Air Force gave the systems such names as Mary, Kay, Susan, and Kathy and arranged them to "simulate a Soviet-style air defense complex. Subsequent to the declassification of the F program, the Air Force managed two other aircraft programs at Area 51, but neither led to the production of operational fleet. Both have been partly declassified, with only some photos and fact sheets providing a few details about these secret programs. The Air Force fact sheet Document 58 reports that the objective was to "demonstrate that curved surfaces on an aircraft result in a low radar return signal" and states that TACIT BLUE "demonstrated that such an aircraft could operate close to the battlefield forward line without fear of being discovered by enemy radar.
The Air Force declassified its existence in , because, according to the fact sheet Document 59 , "its design techniques had become standard practice. Two additional projects that may have been connected to Area 51 were associated with the May 2, raid that resulted in the death of Osama Bin Laden. The other was the RQ stealth drone that had been used to monitor developments at the compound. The topics covered include security arrangements which Kirkpatrick considered inadequate , on-site management, and the survivability of the "program's hardware when and if employed in actual operations.
This memo reports on Bissell's "off-the-cuff" reactions to Kirpatrick's letter Document 1. While he embraced Kirpatrick's comments on security, he had no strong reaction to his comments concerning on-site management, and questioned the proprietary of an inspector general commenting on the issue of OXCART vulnerability. Document 3 : John N. This memo from the DPD's executive officer to its acting chief discusses the possibility of having Area 51 photographed by either a U-2 or CORONA spy satellite — as a means of estimating what the Soviet Union might learn from its own overhead images of the facility.
Document 4 : Robert D. Top Secret. It discusses some of the issues to be considered in deciding whether to release the photograph. It also reports that the photo is the subject of an interagency review and that there was widespread opposition to its release. Document 6 : E. This letter discusses whether the CIA should continue to be responsible for the management of Area 51 or if the Air Force should assume responsibility. This document is widely reported to be a manual for Detachment 3 of the Air Force Security Police, responsible for security at Area It specifies the cover story to be employed by members of the security force to explain their activities.
Document 8 : William J. This letter from President Clinton, notes that his determination exempted the Air Force's operating location "near Groom Lake, Nevada from any Federal, State, interstate, or local hazardous or solid waste laws that might require the disclosure of classified information concerning that operating location to unauthorized persons. Document 9 : George W. This memorandum reaffirms President Clinton's presidential determination Document 8. Document 10a , 10b , 10c : P. Document 11 : Clarence L. Classification Not Available. Most of this paper, written by the first head of the Lockheed Skunk Works, who supervised development of the U-2 and A OXCART , consists of figures related to the brief discussion of the relationship between stealth and aircraft shape.
Document 12 : R. Lorber, R. Wintersdorff, and G. This report describes the research performed by Teledyne Ryan under an Air Force contract on low-radar cross section aerial vehicles as well as some of the results obtained. Document 13 : John D. This paper discusses the impact on the radar cross section of aircraft of the design of different regions of the vehicle — including the nose, tail, broadside — as well as the impact of skin material.
It also discusses the design a low RCS missile. This briefing book consists of five tabs, which concern the value and evolution of stealth, the F, the B-2, the F, and the advanced cruise missile. Document 15 : Major General Peter T. This extract provides a statement of facts concerning the fatal crash of a FA aircraft on July 11, It covers, inter alia , crew qualifications, the history of the flight, the mission, the briefing and preflight, the flight, impact, rescue, and crash response.
Document 16 : Lt. John T. This extract is a summary of facts concerning the October 14, crash of a FA that claimed the life of its pilot. As with the report of the on the July crash Document 15 , it covers — inter alia — crew qualifications, the history of the flight, the mission, the briefing and preflight, the flight, impact, rescue, and crash response. Document 17 : Harold P. A two-page introduction is followed by a page chronology of FA information related to operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, from August 17, to February 28, The information include concerns personnel, deployments, administrative matters, exercises, and operations pp.
Document 18 : Arthur P. Army War College, This study focuses on the history of stealth development, the roles and missions of the FA and its performance during Desert Storm, and an assessment of how stealth technology fits into Air Force aerospace doctrine. It also discusses next generation stealth aircraft, specifically the F fighter and B-2 bomber. Document 19 : Vincent C. In addition to a chronology of events, this history includes a discussion of the creation of the 37 th Fighter Wing established to replace the covert group established to oversee development of the FA while it was still a classified program , the "quest for normalization," F operations in Panama Operation Just Cause and Iraq Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm , and events from the end of Desert Storm to the end of Document 20a , 20b : Vincent C.
This history contains a discussion of the inactivation, fully redacted sections on mission revision and an operational readiness exercise - as well as treatments of the the employment of the FA in airshows, transfer of aircraft to Holloman, and a number of other topics. These fact sheets, issued twelve years apart, describe the mission, features, background, and general characteristics of the FA. The second fact sheet contains details of the plane's employment in Desert Storm, the Balkans, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Document 22 : Ronald H. The focus of this history is the involvement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff in the planning and direction of combat operations in Panama. Part of the history discusses the decision to use the FA as part of the operation — its first operational use — and its employment.
This study focuses on the use and performance of aircraft and other munitions in Desert Storm, including the F, the validity of Defense Department claims about weapon systems' performance particularly systems using advanced technology , the relationship between weapon system cost and performance, and the extent to which Desert Storm air campaign objectives were satisfied. Among its findings was that while F bomb hit range varied between 41 and 60 percent, which the report characterized as "highly effective," the range was less than the percent rate report after the war by the Defense Department.
Document 24 : Gregg S. This history focuses on mission and organization, operations and training including operations against Iraqi targets, and partcipation in the Red Flag exercise , and aircraft upgrades. Document 25 : Gregory S. As with the history for the preceding eighteen months Document 24 the main focus of this history is mission and organization and operations and training. In addition to its discussion of FA deployment to Southwest Asia in response to developments in Iraq the history also discusses several exercises — Spirit Hawk '98 described as "the Air Force's first ever low observable combat exercise" , Combat Hammer a weapons system evaluation program exercise — as well as deployment in support of Fighter Weapons Instructor Course.
Document 26 : Gregory S. This history discusses deployments to in support of operations in the Balkans and Southwest Asia. Security Council resolutions and did not result in combat operations. Document 27 : William P. Alexander and Gregory S. This history follows the standard format for 49 th Fighter Wing histories — covering mission and organization, operations and training, and maintenance. The chapter on operations includes a discussion of the FA deployment to Europe and its use against Serbian targets.
Document 28 : William P.Document 24 - Version 2. Each school GWU Personal Statement different requirements for standardized GWU Personal Statement. Visit our GWU Personal Statement now.